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SOCIAL NORMS AND DEFAULT
RULES ANALYSIS
LISA BERNSTEIN*

This comment explores how the insights of relational contract
theory can be integrated into the analytic framework of default rules
analysis (DRA). It rejects Jay Feinman's contention that using a
"relational approach... would [necessarily] ask different questions,",and argues that social norms and other aspects of the contracting context that are of central importance to relational theory are directly
relevant to the questions and concerns 2 that are at the heart of two of
the leading academic approaches to DRA:3 the consent theory articulated by Barnett4 and the economic approach developed by Ayres and
* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. I would like to thank Ian
Ayres, Randy Barnett, Edward Bernstein, Robert Bone, Joseph Brodley, David Charny, Daniel
Klerman, Robert Merges, Mark Petit, Matthew Spitzer, Manuel Utset and Todd Rakoff.
1. Jay M. Feinman, RelationalContractandDefaultRules, 3 S. CAL. IuTmpisc. L. 43,43

(1993).
2. Ibis comment does not take issue with Richard Craswell's observation that relational
scholars and law-and-economics scholars tend to be interested in different questions. See Richard Craswell, The Relational Move. Some Questions from Law and Economics, 3 S.CAT.

IT-Nrmsc. L. 91, 91 (1993). Rather, it argues that many aspects of contracting relationships
that are of interest to relational scholars, are, in many transactional settings, directly relevant to
the questions and concerns that are of interest to law-and-economics scholars.
3. This comment discusses DRA solely in the context of a negotiated business transaction.
But see infra note 78. Although the DRA literature sometimes focuses on corporate law and
products liability, many of the issues discussed in this comment would be analyzed differently in
these contexts. In many areas of corporate governance, collective action problems prevent
shareholders from bargaining with management. Similarly, in the products liability context, one
party to the transaction tends to have vastly inferior information, and collective action problems
effectively prevent meaningful negotiation. Consequently, the justifications for using a hypothetical bargain approach to gap filling in these contexts may be stronger than they are in the
context of a negotiated business transaction. Se e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, CorporateControl Transactions,91 YALr LJ. 698,702 (1982) (suggesting that the fiduciary
duty that managers owe investors should reflect the hypothetical bargain that managers and
investors would have struck had they been able to costlessly negotiate with one another free of
collective action problems); Alan Schwartz, Proposalsfor ProductsLiability Reform: A Theoreti-

cal Synthesis, 97 YALE L. 353,361 (1988) (suggesting that products liability legislation should
be modeled on the hypothetical contract that fully informed consumers would bargain for if they
could do so costlessly).
4. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and ContractualConsent,78
VA. L.Rnv. 821 (1992).
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Gertner 5
This comment argues thait recognizing the centrality of social
norms in many transactional settings and acknowledging that not all
transactions are "discrete" and that not all transactors appear to act as
"steely-eyed utility maximizers," neither fundamentally undermines
DRA nor justifies adoption of Feinman's "relational alternative." It
concludes that when the analytic frameworks developed in the DRA
literature are modified to take relational factors into account, it is possible to gain new insights into the default rules debate.
This comment also suggests that current judicial, legislative and
academic approaches to DRA need to take into account the implications of the widespread availability of private alternative dispute resolution (ADR). It demonstrates that adapting the consent theory and
the economic theory of DRA to take into account the availability of
ADR alters their conclusions in ways that must be recognized if they
are to provide useful guidance to courts and legislatures in deciding
how best to deal with contractual gaps.
Part I discusses the role of social norms in legislative and judicial
approaches to gap filling and describes the consent theory and economic theory of DRA. It then explores the extent to which these
approaches to DRA take relational factors into account and concludes
that while the consent theory explicitly incorporates many of the factors relational theorists consider important, the economic theory
needs to be modified if it is to adequately take into account the differences between "discrete" and "continuing" exchange and the influence of relational factors on parties' drafting decisions.

5. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic
Theory of DefaultRules, 99 YAE L. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner I]. For additional
economically oriented approaches to DRA, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, StrategicContractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE W. 729 (1992); Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAt. L. Ruv. 261 (1985) (arguing that parties
sometimes decide not to draft around default rules since the risk of legal error increases when a
default rule is varied by a specific contractual provision); Jason S. Johnston, StrategicBargaining
and the Economic Theory of ContractDefault Rules, 100 YALE W. 615 (1990) (arguing that the
economic literature on default rules does not adequately take into account parties' incentives to
engage in strategic bargaining); Robert E.Scott, A RelationalTheory of Default Rules for CommercialContracts,19 J.LEGAL STuD. 597 (1990); Clayton P. Gillette, CommercialRelationships
and the Selection of Default Rulesfor Remote Risks, 19. L zGAL STEM. 535 (1990) (using economic analysis to explore the choice of default rules for remote risks from both a cooperative
(relational) and egoistic (rational actor) perspective).
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Part II considers how giving more explicit recognition to social
norms and other relational factors might alter the analysis and conclusions of DRA. It suggests
that in highly relational exchanges, the
"relational discount" 6 on the benefit of contracting around legal
default rules may be so large, and the "relational costs"7 of doing so
may be so high, that parties may not contract around even those legal
default rules they find highly undesirable.
Part III discusses Feinman's "relational alternative," which would
fill contractual gaps using "norms, insights, arguments, and rules of
thumb."'8 It argues that filling gaps with subjective relational standards may decrease access to justice for poorer, more risk-averse litigants, and may, depending on the content of such standards, limit
contracting opportunities for certain types of transactors.
Finally, Part IV considers the implications for both DRA and
Feinman's "relational alternative" of the widespread availability of
ADR. It concludes that legal default rules should be structured to
give parties an incentive to opt out of the legal system in situations
where their doing so would be socially desirable.
I. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NORMS AND RELATIONAL
FACTORS IN DRA
One of Feinman's strongest objections to DRA is that "[s]ocial
norms are powerful motivators of behavior, yet DRA has no place for
them."9 However, he fails to recognize the extent to which social
norms and other relational factors are already incorporated into
existing legal and academic approaches to gap filling and DRA. One
of the underlying goals of the Uniform Commercial Code is "to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom,
usage and agreement of the parties"; 0° the code explicitly permits contracts to be "explained or supplemented.., by course of dealing or
usage of trade."'"
6.
7.
8.
9.

See infra text accompanying notes 3945.
See id.
Feinman, supra note 1, at 54.
I at 53.

10. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1990).
11. Id. § 2-202(a); see also id. § 2-208(1) (noting that "any course of performance accepted
or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement"); id. § 2-207(3) ("Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise
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In addition, courts often seek to resolve linguistic ambiguities and
fill contractual gaps by reconstructing the parties' hypothetical bargain, asking the question, "[W]hat would the parties have agreed to
had they explicitly adverted to the issue?" 1 2 Although some courts
answer this question in a relatively objective and formalistic manner,

others engage in a broad-ranging factual inquiry 3 that explicitly takes
into account social norms14 and other aspects of the contracting context that relational theorists consider important. On a doctrinal level,
the hypothetical bargain approach provides no guidance on how particularized and contextualized the court's inquiry should be.15 As a
consequence, it is consistent with giving social norms and institutions
establish a contract."). In addition, just as the "idea of balancing party planning against maintaining flexibility as relations develop," is a central tenet of relational contract theory, see
Feinman, supra note 1, at 56, the Official Comment to U.C.C. § 1-102 notes that "[tlhis Act is
drawn to provide flexibility so that.., it will provide its own machinery for expansion of commercial practices."
12. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains:The Normative Structure of ContractInterpreta.
lion, 89 MICH. L. Rav. 1815, 1815 (1991) (exploring and critiquing the hypothetical bargain
approach to gap filling and contractual interpretation); see also Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508
A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch.1986) (explaining that in deciding whether a particular action constitutes
breach of the implied covenant of good faith, the court should ask: "[I]s
it clear from what was
expressly agreed upon that the parties who negotiated the express terms of the contract would
have agreed to proscribe the act later complained of as a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith-had they thought to negotiate with respect to that matter."); Wisconsin Real Estate Inv.
'Trust v. Weinstein, 781 F.2d 589,593 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.)(" When supplying terms
of an effective but incomplete contract a court properly picks those for which the parties probably would have bargained, had they anticipated the problem:').
13. Chamy, supra note 12, at 1821-23,1829-30 (comparing Justice Traynor's contextualized
approach to reconstructing the parties' bargain in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968), with Judge Kozinski's objectivized approach in
Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988)).
14. Id.at 1856-57 (suggesting that in reconstructing hypothetical bargains courts use custom in three ways: "First, to determine what transactors intend by using a term, courts may
advert to how transactors ordinarily use that term....Second, courts consult trade custom to
infer meaning from how parties conduct themselves ...Third, courts may infer meaning from
parties' conduct in reference to particular language").
15. Id.at 1821 (suggesting four approaches to reconstructing hypothetical bargains:
"choose the best rule for this transaction type," "choose the rule that these particularparties
most likely would have negotiated," "choose the rule that the parties in this situation would have
chosen if they were rational and perfectly informed," and "choose the rule that parties to this
transaction type would most likely choose in the general run of situations"). However, while a
court using the hypothetical bargain approach might make a detailed inquiry into relational
aspects of the contracting context, the purpose of the inquiry would be to determine what the
parties would have agreed to at the time of contracting. In contrast, a court using the relational
approach would also focus on events that occurred both before and after contract formation,
since the relational "paradigm indicates the continuity of the contracting event with other elements of relational context, both preceding and following the formal contract." Feinman, supra
note 1, at 54.
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the greater prominence relational scholars consider appropriate. 16
Feinman also fails to appreciate that while neither the consent
theory nor the economic theory gives relational factors the prominence they deserve, relational factors are, to some extent, explicitly
taken into account in the consent theory, and are relevant to many of
the considerations the economic theory identifies as being central to
parties' drafting decisions.
A. CONSENT THEORY
Barnett's theory of conventionalist default rules is based on his
consent theory of contract;' 7 it endeavors to give the greatest weight
possible to parties' subjective manifestations of assent. According to
Barnett, "where a consent to jurisdiction exists but is insufficient to
justify the enforcement of any promulgated set of default rules, consent justifies the enforcement of conventionalist default rules."18
These rules are given content by "seek[ing] the most plausible interpretation of the conduct of the parties within the relevant community
of discourse," that is, "the general community of which both parties
are members or, where the parties are merchants, their particular
trade."19 This approach can be highly contextualized. As Barnett
explains, "if it can be shown that the parties are highly idiosyncratic
and have in essence their own 'private 20language,' then the 'community
of discourse' consists solely of them."
Although Barnett does not specify the precise factual inquiry
needed to determine the content of conventionalist defaults, it would
most likely encompass many of the factors important to the relational
approach, which "focuses attention on certain features of relationships
and localizes the rules and decisions in particular relationships and
classes of relationships."'I Barnett considers his consent theory of
16. Butsee Feinman, supra note 1, at54 (noting that "it is incorrect to attempt to determine
the content of default rules based on what the parties would have wanted [(the hypothetical
bargain)], because that approach overemphasizes and idealizes the discrete act of contracting.").
17. For a detailed articulation of the consent theory of contract, see Randy E. Barnett, A
Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLum. L. REV.269 (1986).
18. Barnett, supra note 4, at 829.
19. Id. at 862 & n.90.
20. Id. at 862 n.90.
21. Feinman, supra note 1, at 54. For example, defining the relevant community of discourse requires an inquiry into the parties' status and whether they should be considered
merchants in the same trade. Similarly, determining whether the parties have their own "private
language" requires an inquiry into whether or not they had a prior course of dealing. However,
while Feinman and Barnett both view evidence of social norms and other relational factors as
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contract a relational theory; comparing it to Ian Macneil's relational
approach,' Barnett suggests that "what separates Macneil's relational
theory of contract from a consent theory may not be that one is relational and the other is not, but rather that a consent theory is a relational approach that is decidedly liberal whereas Macneil's is a
relational approach that is communitarian."
Barnett is also sensitive to the questions of baseline and perspective that are at the core of Feinman's critique of DRA. As Feinman
explains, the DRA "paradigm suggests the completeness of the parties' contracting, with occasional gaps filled by default rules," whereas
from a relational perspective it is impossible to know if a contractual
gap exists without recognizing the broader relational context in which
the contract was made. 4 Similarly, Barnett acknowledges the indeterminacy of labeling a given contractual silence a gap, noting
that "the
legal system usually cannot know whether it is facing a situation of
true gaps or tacit assumptions."2 5
B.

THE ECONOMIC THEORY

Ayres and Gertnr's economic theory of default rules explores
the ways that the content of default rules can be used to create incentives for parties to draft the largest possible number of efficient contracts.2 1 It compares the incentive effects and efficiency implications
of hypothetical bargain defaults, which fill gaps with what the parties
would have wanted, and penalty defaults, which are "purposefully set
at what the parties would not want" in order to "give at least one
party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule
"27

relevant to contract adjudication, they have fundamentally different views of the purpose of
contract adjudication. Barnett views the central task of contract adjudication as discerning the
parties' intent and giving legal effect only to those rights and obligations the parties consented to

create. See Barnett, supra note 4. In contrast, Feinman views the central task of contract adjudication as imposing desirable social values on contracting parties. See Feinman, supra note 1, at
56.
22. Feinman views Macneil as a like-minded relational scholar. See Feinman,supra note 1,
at 45 n.4.
23. Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions:A Critiqueof Ian Macneil's RelationalTheory of
Contract,78 VA. L. Rnv. 1175, 1205 (1992).
24. Feinman, supra note 1, at 53-54.
25. Barnett, supra note 4, at 882.
26. See generally Ayres & Gertner I, supra note 5.
27. Id. at 91.
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The economic theory suggests that when contractual gaps are due
to the transaction costs of negotiating and drafting specific provisions,
hypothetical bargain defaults are appropriate when it is less expensive
for the court to reconstruct the parties' hypothetical bargain ex post
than it would be for the parties to negotiate an explicit contractual
provision ex ante.8 In contrast, when the cost to the court of filling a
gap ex post is greater than the cost to the parties of including a specific provision ex ante, a penalty default is appropriate since it will
decrease parties' incentives to "inefficiently shift the process of gap
filling to ex post court determination." 9 In addition, when contractual gaps are due to strategic behavior-such as a party's reluctance to
propose a provision that might reveal information that would lead to a
price adjustment 3 ---penalty defaults will ordinarily be preferred to
hypothetical bargain defaults since they will "induce knowledgeable
parties to reveal information by contracting around the default
penalty.

3 1I

Although Ayres and Gertner do not explicitly discuss the influence of relational factors on parties' decisions to accept or contract
around default rules, as discussed in Part II, social norms and relational factors affect many of the considerations that the economic theory identifies as being central to the parties' drafting decisions, such as
the transaction costs of negotiating and drafting specific provisions,
the probability of breach, and the distribution of information between
the parties? 2 In addition, the importance of taking relational factors
into account when choosing between hypothetical bargain and penalty
defaults becomes apparent once it is recognized that in order for
Ayres and Gertner's framework to lead to efficient contracting it
needs to be modified in two ways. First, rather than comparing the
cost to the parties of drafting a provision ex ante to the cost to the
court of filling the gap ex post, the cost to the parties of drafting the
provision ex ante should be compared to the expected cost to the
court of filling the gap ex post-the cost discounted by the likelihood
that a dispute related to the provision will arise and actually go to
28. Id. at 93.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 101-04 (discussing the reasons why parties are often reluctant to suggest contracting around the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854)).
31. Id. at 94.
32. For example, in many situations the distribution ofinformation between the parties will
depend on incidents of their status, the market in which they are transacting, and the size of their
business.
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trial 3 3 Second, in determining the type of contracting behavior it is
socially desirable to encourage, it is also important to consider the fact
that the parties themselves may fill the gap at the time the contingency
arises. In highly relational exchanges where parties view cooperation
as being in their own best interest, the expected cost to the parties of
negotiating a gap-filling term at the time the contingency arises may
be less than the cost to the parties of including a specific provision ex
ante or the expected cost to the court of filling a gap ex post.3 4 As a
consequence, in certain transactional contexts, the socially desirable
default rule might be one that encouraged the parties to fill the gap
cooperatively at the time the contingency arose, and minimized the
transaction costs of their doing so.
In sum, because relational considerations affect the expected cost
to the parties of filling the gap when a contingency arises, the cost to
the parties of including a specific provision ex ante, and the expected
cost to the court of filling the gap ex post, they need to be taken into
account in determining the types of contracting behavior it is socially
33. It is important to note that even setting aside relational considerations, the probability
of breach (or, the probability of a particular contingency arising) needs to be taken into account
in the economic approach.
34. There are a number of reasons why at the time of contracting the expected cost to the
parties of filling a gap if a contingency arises might be lower than both the expected cost to the
court of filling the gap ex post and the cost to the parties of including a specific contractual
provision ex ante. Frst, even if the cost of drafting a specific provision is the same as the cost of
negotiating a term at the time the contingency arises, the costs of negotiating a term at the time
the contingency arises will only be incurred if the contingency actually arises, whereas the cost of
drafting the provision will be incurred with certainty. Second, it is often easier to deal with a
contingency when the actual consequences of its happening are known with certainty. Third, the
value of the relationship to both parties might increase during the course of performance. If, at
the time the contingency arises, the parties attach a greater value to achieving a cooperative
outcome than they did at the time of contracting, the actual cost of negotiating a gap-filling term
may be lower than the cost of negotiating a specific provision would have been at the time the
contract was entered into. For example, in a buyer-supplier situation, after a period of performance, the buyer might be impressed by the quality of the supplier's products, his willingness to
make production adjustments in response to changes in the buyer's specifications, and in his
ability to meet production deadlines. Similarly, the supplier might be impressed by the buyer's
record of prompt payment, his willingness to pay small price increases when production adjustments are requested, or his willingness to accept substitute materials when substitutions are warranted by market conditions. Once both sides attach a higher value to the relationship and have
incurred relationship-specific sunk costs, they have a greater incentive to cooperate than they
did at the time the contract was entered into and other trading partners were available. Thus,
the expected cost of negotiating an additional term if the contingency occurs during the course of
performance might be lower than the cost to the parties of negotiating and specifying the term
ex ante or the expected cost to the court of filling the gap ex post. Furthermore, there may be
additional benefits to deferring consideration of some contingencies such as avoiding relational
costs, reducing the risk of transaction breakdown, and increasing the likelihood of concluding
the transaction by the relevant deadline.
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desirable to encourage and the types of default rules that are most
likely to induce such behavior.
C. SUMMAY
Thus, although the consent theory explicitly takes some relational
factors into account, and relational factors will affect many of the considerations the economic theory identifies as being central to parties'
drafting decisions, neither theory adequately takes into account the
myriad of ways that social norms and other relational factors influence
parties' negotiating and drafting decisions throughout the contracting
process. However, explicitly incorporating relational factors into
these approaches to DRA would not, as Feinman maintains, undermine their analytic structure by demonstrating that "neither [their]
assumptions nor [their] conclusions are sound."'3 5 Rather, as the analysis presented in Part II demonstrates, distinguishing between "discrete" and "relational" exchanges and giving more explicit recognition
to the ways that relational factors influence parties' drafting decisions,
enriches the analysis of the academic approaches to DRA and demonstrates the power of their analytic structures.
II. INCORPORATING RELATIONAL FACTORS INTO DRA
The strength of social norms and institutions in a given transactional context affects whether transactors will find it worthwhile to use
legally enforceable contracts;36 it also affects the likelihood that they
will choose to vary legal default rules. In many transactional settings,
promises are kept for reasons wholly unrelated to the existence of a
legally enforceable contract. Parties may be induced to perform or
voluntarily compensate the promisee in the event of nonperformance
out of fear of nonlegal sanctions such as reputational damage.37 Or,
35. Feinman, supra note 1, at 54.
36. The existence of a legally enforceable contract may, in some contexts, strengthen the
force and effect of social norms and extralegal sanctions by serving the channeling, evidentiary
and cautionary functions of formality. See Lan L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLuM. L.
R-v. 799, 800-01 (1941). In order for some extralegal sanctions such as damage to reputation to
have a significant effect on parties' behavior, third parties must be able to verify that an agreement existed and a breach occurred. Consequently, if a party is found by a court to have
breached a contract, he may suffer greater damage to his reputation than he would if he had
merely breached an extralegal agreement. In addition, the fact that a judgment has been rendered against him sends a signal that he not only failed to meet his commercial obligations, but
also failed to cooperatively resolve a dispute with his trading partner.
37. For an overview of nonlegal sanctions, see David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctionsin Commercial Relationships,104 HARv.L. Rpv. 373,392-94 (1990) (discussing the three main types of
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as Feinman suggests, they may be moved to do so by social custom or
a "concern for relationships, trust, honor, and decency." 38 In transactional contexts where social norms or fear of nonlegal sanctions result
nonlegal sanctions that play a role in commercial transactions, namely "the sacrifice of a relationship-specific prospective advantage," "loss of reputation among market participants," and
"the sacrifice of psychic and social goods" (emphasis omitted)).
38. Fenman,supra note 1, at 52. Feinman rejects the notion that these concerns "can be
explained away by elaborate calculations of interest," id., and maintains that "social norms cannot be reduced to optimizing mechanisms in disguise." Id. at 53. However, a growing body of
empirical research on social norms suggests that in many markets or transactional contexts,
social norms, nonlegal sanctions and extralegal dispute resolution institutions tend to be efficient
from the perspective of market insiders. See, eg., Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust,
and Economic Organization,36 J.L. EcoN. 453 (1993) (drawing on a variety of examples to
demonstrate that behavior social scientists refer to as trusting or non-calculative can often be
explained as calculative when viewed in a wider social context); ROBERT C.ELuCKsON, ORDER
Wrrour LAW: How NEGrmoRs SE-ran DlspurEs 167 (1991) (using evidence from a number
of case studies to support the hypothesis that "members of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their
work-a-day affairs with one another."); Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesisof Wealth-Maximizing
Norms: Evidencefrom the WhalingIndustry, 5 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 83,84 (1989) (using evidence
from the early-American whaling industry to provide support for the "hypothesis that when
people are situated in a close-knit group, they will tend to develop for the ordinary run of
problems norms that are wealth-maximizing."); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal ContractualRelations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (concluding that the diamond industry's transactional rules and private dispute resolution institutions
have endured since they are an efficient way to structure exchanges and resolve disputes). As a
consequence, in markets or transactional contexts with well-developed social norms, even transactors who make no individual calculations of self-interest, but choose instead to act in accordance with such well-developed norms, may make the same decisions as a "steely-eyed utility
maximizer." Social norms may already embody a cost-benefit analysis. See, eg., HmNiu Ln,'Aon,
ToMoRRow, CAPrrAsM (Sheilagh C. Ogilvie trans., 1978) (arguing that "customs and tradition
survive because ... they offer more benefits than costs"). For an overview of the economic and
philosophical literature exploring the idea that social norms tend to be efficient, see JoHN GRAY,
HAYEK oN LmERTY (2d ed. 1986).

In arguing against the validity of the "assumptions of rationality and self-interest," Feinman
points to the fact that "[i]n commercial behavior involving transactions of all types, parties often
fail to bargain to the last dollar. [They] ... talk of obtaining a good price or a fair price, but not
necessarily the best prie..
. ." See Feinman, supra note 1, at 52. However, the developing
literature in game theory and law has begun to demonstrate that what relational scholars call
cooperative or altruistic behavior is often a rational utility-maximizing strategy, especially in the
types of long-term repeat-dealing situations that are of central concern to relational contract
theorists. See, eg., Scott, supra note 5 (arguing that "[clontracting parties agree (explicitly or
implicitly) to cooperate in the future, not because of altruism, but because it lowers the ex ante
contract price by more than the cost of cooperation"); Gillette, supra note 5, at 540 (explaining
that "a party may bargain for cooperation in the belief that mutual promises to coordinate are
likely to produce higher personal payoffs than threats of defection from the relationship"); see
also ROBERT SUODEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, Co-oPERAMioN AND WELFARE (1986)

(exploring the ways that strategies with a high degree of cooperation can maximize joint payoffs
in many simple games, including the repeat-play prisoners' dilemma). For an additional explanation of why it is often rational for even "self-interested social isolates" not to bargain to the last
dollar, see infra note 44 and accompanying text.
Feinman also maintains that the methodology employed by law-and-economics scholars is
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in a high probability that promises will be performed or that adequate
damages will be voluntarily tendered in the event of nonperformance,
the value added by placing the agreement in legally enforceable form
may be small-a legally enforceable agreement only creates value to
the extent that it gives the parties something they would not have had
if the transaction had been concluded with a handshake.
Relational factors will also have a strong influence on parties'
perceptions of the benefits of contracting around legal default rules? 9
Consider the following example. Suppose that two "self-interested
social isolates" who intend to rely solely on their legal rights in the
event of a dispute are deciding whether or not to include a provision
dealing with a given contingency.4 The provision costs $5.00 to draft
and will create an additional $10.00 of value if the contingency occurs
flawed and their conclusions invalid since "it takes remarkable modesty for scholars to assume
that ordinary people can intuitively arrive at the analysis that yields optimal results, when schol-

ars can do so only after much sophisticated training and work," particularly when such people
often lack complete information. Feinman, supra note 1, at 52. However, economists and game
theorists have developed ways to model decision making in situations characterized by uncertainty and asymmetric information. See; eg., HOwAR.D RAU7A, DECIsioN AnALYsis: ITmoDucroY LEcTUREs ON CHoICEs UrNER UNcERTAIrY (1968) (discussing "how an individual
who is faced with a problem of choice under uncertainty should go about choosing a course of
action that is consistent with his personal basic judgments and preferences"). In addition, a
growing body of research has begun to explore the ways that market forces may, under certain
conditions, help ensure that parties with incomplete information enter into the same contractual

arrangements that would be selected by fully informed parties. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz &Louis
L. Wilde, Interveningin Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. Rnv. 630 (1979) (suggesting that in deciding whether legal intervention
in consumer markets is appropriate, "[r]ather than asking whether an idealized individual is
sufficiently informed to maximize his own utility, the appropriate normative inquiry is whether
competition among firms for particular groups of searchers is, in any given market, sufficient to
generate optimal prices and terms for all consumers.")
At this juncture it is important to note that whether or not parties' decisions to value attributes of their relationship, such as trust and good will, are rational or not is of no consequence to
the argument made in the text. The importance of parties' views of the relational cost, see infra
text accompanying notes 40-45, of suggesting that certain default rules be varied, does not
depend on the reasons, rational or not, that parties choose to value those aspects of their relationship that might be jeopardized by suggesting that too many default rules be altered by specific contractual provisions.
39. Although the signaling effects discussed in the text maybe particularly strong in a relational context, they are present to some extent in all commercial transactions. Because litigation
is expensive and expectation damages never fully compensate the promisee, all contracts are
backed, at least in part, by a reputation bond. Just as the use of legally enforceable contracts can
increase the value of extralegal sanctions, the threat of extralegal sanctions in a given transactional context can increase the value of a legally enforceable promise by increasing both the
probability of performance and the probability that compensation will be voluntarily tendered in
the event of nonperformance.
40. Although it is assumed for simplicity that the probability of the contingency happening
is not affected by relational factors, the likelihood of many types of contingencies, such as breach
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and the court applies the provision rather than the relevant legal
default rule. In this situation, the parties will compare the cost of
including the provision, here $5.00, to the expected benefit of including it-($10.00) x (the probability that the contingency will occur) x
(the probability that if the contingency occurs, the court will be asked
to resolve the dispute, here 100%)-and will only include it if the
expected benefit of doing so is greater than the cost. The self-interested social isolates will therefore include the clause only if the
probability of the contingency occurring is greater than 50%. Now
suppose that two parties with strong relational ties are considering
including the same provision. In the event that the contingency
occurs, these parties may be reluctant to go to court and quite likely to
work out a cooperative agreement on how to deal with the contingency. If these parties view the likelihood that they will be unable to
reach a cooperative agreement in the event that the contingency
occurs as 25%, and the probability that the contingency will occur as
60%, unlike the "self-interested social isolates," they will not opt to
include the provision since the expected benefit to them of doing so,
$1.50-($10.00) x (60% chance of the contingency occurring) x (25%
chance that if the contingency occurs the court will be called on to
resolve the dispute)-is less than the cost of doing so, $5.00. The difference between the "self-interested social isolates"' estimate of the
likelihood that in the event of a dispute the terms of the contract and/
or legal default rules will be used to resolve the dispute, assumed for
simplicity to be 100%, and the relational transactors' estimate of this
probability, will be referred to as the "relational discount." The existence of the relational discount suggests that in transactional contexts
where relational ties are strong, the expected benefit of contracting
around undesirable default rules may be small.
Relational factors may also affect the cost of contracting around
default rules. In transactional settings where informal norms are an
important part of the parties' contracting relationship, a party may be
reluctant to suggest varying a particular default rule even if the "direct
transaction costs" are low and the variation would make both parties
better off. Suggesting that a default rule be varied might be interpreted as a signal that the party suggesting the modification is more
likely than previously thought to rely on his legal rights in the event of
of contract, late delivery, or non-conforming goods, may be strongly affected by relational factors. For example, in markets where reputation is important, a party (even a steely-eyed utility
maximizer) may prefer to perform a contract (even one that is unprofitable) in order to maintain
his reputation for meeting his commercial obligations.

[Vol. 3:59 1.993]

SOCIAL NORMS

a dispute. If suggesting that a default rule be varied alters the other
party's view of either the likelihood of a dispute arising, or the likelihood of both a dispute arising and winding up in court, this may affect
his view of the costs and benefits of altering other provisions. Every
time a default rule is varied by a contractual provision, the perceived
benefit from contracting around other default rules increases since the
perceived probability that default rules will be relevant to the parties'
contracting relationship increases. Similarly, for every rule contracted
around, the perceived cost of suggesting that an additional rule be
varied decreases since the value of the "trust and cooperation" that
this action will diminish is smaller. 41 As a consequence, if party A
proposes contracting around certain default rules, party B may find it
worthwhile to propose that certain other default rules be altered to his
advantage. Alternatively, he may either refuse to deal with party A or
agree to do so only if party A offers a price adjustment to compensate
him for the added perceived risk of litigation.
Similar barriers to contracting around default rules are also present even intransactional settings where the parties do not have longterm business or social relationships and tend to think about the transaction in terms of their legal rights and duties. Parties often approach
contract negotiations with an idea of how similar transactions are usually structured; they have in their minds an implicit form contract42
made up of clauses such as price that are commonly negotiated, boilerplate provisions,4 and legal default rules. A party may be wary of
41. The argument in the text does not suggest that once one party proposes contracting
around a single default rule, an infinite chain of proposals and counterproposals will take place
until the transaction breaks down or a complete contingent state contract has been drafted.
Some default rules can be varied without sending a negative signal. In a sale of goods transaction, for example, proposing a price term is unlikely to send a negative signal, even though in the
absence of a price term the court would enforce the contract and fill the gap with a reasonable
price. U.C.C. § 2-305 (1990). In addition, in transactional contexts where there is an average
level of drafting specificity that parties associate with particular transaction types, proposing
certain types of contractual provisions, or proposing only a small number of provisions, might
not trigger the process of proposal and counterproposal discussed in the text. Furthermore,
when both parties view cooperation as important, there are a number of strategies they can
adopt to prevent this unraveling from occurring and, over time, those strategies that effectively
prevent this type of unraveling may evolve into well-established social norms.
42. As Todd Rakoff observes, "[in different social settings different norms are clustered
around the practice of contracting itself.... different norms about how many terms, and which
terms, parties should specify." Todd D. Rakoff, Social Structure,Legal Structure, and Default
Rules: A Comment, 3 S. CAL. IfNTamsc. L. 19,25 (1993).
43. Parties may be reluctant to alter boilerplate provisions that have been litigated in the
past since the risk of legal error associated with highly tailored negotiated provisions may be
higher. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 5, at 286. However, if the tailored contractual provisions
are based on established industry norms and customs, and are accompanied by a wiseman clause
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suggesting too many deviations from the implicit form contract since
this might be interpreted as a signal that he is a less reliable or more
contentious trading partner than the average market participant. As
in a relational setting, this signal might, in turn, lead the other party to
either propose additional provisions or demand a price adjustment to
compensate him for the added perceived risk that a dispute will arise.
It might also increase the risk of transaction breakdown as well as the
likelihood that the transaction will not be consummated by the relevant deadline.4 4
The existence of these relational costs of contracting around
designating an industry expert to resolve all disputes in accordance with industry norms, parties
who might previously have accepted the relatively untailored legal default rule in order to avoid
increased adjudicative error costs, may now opt to include both a tailored substantive provision
and an ADR clause. Thus, in some situations, ADR provisions may enable parties to capture
the benefits of more tailored contractual provisions without increasing the risk of adjudicative
error. They can also reduce drafting costs by reducing the need for specificity since a provision
that might appear to be vague and standard-like to a judge, might appear clear and rule-like to
an industry insider. As Todd Rakoff observes, in some situations in which there is a strong usage
governing the trade, "[a] norm statement which to an outsider appears as a standard, may to
insiders appear as a rule." For example, "'substantial performance' might ... have quite clear
contours in the construction industry. Conversely, trade usage can make what is facially a rule
into something which is in fact quite squishy; 'tender conforming in all respects to the contract'
can become a standard if the contract terms themselves are understood by usage to allow for
deviations to some degree, all things considered." Rakoff, supra note 42, at 26.
44. The effect of these risks on the value of the transaction will depend, in some measure,
on the stage in the contracting process that the provision is proposed. The cost of bargaining
breakdown may be low at the outset of the transaction if sunk costs are low and other trading
partners are available. In contrast, transaction breakdown at the final stages of the negotiation
may impose high costs on the parties in the form of sunk negotiation and transaction costs, as
well as lost opportunities for profitable exchange. In later stages of the negotiating process, the
potential benefit of extracting an additional dollar of value through inclusion of additional provision may be outweighed by the expected cost of the request-the increase in the likelihood of
transaction breakdown multiplied by the cost of transaction breakdown. This suggests that
Feinman's observation that "[i]n commercial behavior involving transactions of all types, parties
often fail to bargain to the last dollar," Feinman, supranote 1, at 52, is not inconsistent with the
assumption that many transactors are rational actors.
In addition, principal-agent problems sometimes lead the people who actually negotiate
contracts to weigh the risk of transaction breakdown or failure to close by the relevant deadline
more heavily than their actual effect on the value of the transaction. For example, a business
manager whose superior gives her responsibility for concluding a transaction may be more concered about closing the deal by the relevant time deadline than she is with the selection of the
most desirable contractual provision or default rule that will apply in the event of a contingency
that will happen, if at all, several years in the future. Similarly, a senior lawyer who is hired to
conclude a transaction and who fears losing the client's business if he fails to do so, will give
tremendous weight to the risk of negotiation breakdown or failure to close by the relevant deadline. Conversely, a junior lawyer may fear the consequences (such as loss of his job) of not
having raised a particular contingency if it in fact comes to pass, and may therefore propose
many provisions that actually decrease the value of the transaction.
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default rules,45 together with the relational discount on the benefit of
doing so, suggests that in many contracting contexts relational factors

may influence parties' negotiating and contracting decisions in ways
that DRA must take into account if it is to provide useful guidance to
courts and legislatures in deciding how best to deal with contractual
gaps. The remainder of this section explores the ways that recognizing
the importance of social norms and other relational factors in many
transactional contexts might alter the analysis and conclusions of
DRA.
A.

CONSENT THEORY

According to the consent theory, "when the transaction costs of
discovering and contracting around the [legal] default rules are sufficiently low, a party's consent to be legally bound, coupled with silence
on the issue in question may well constitute consent to the imposition
of the particular [legal] default rule ...,"46 In contrast, when transaction costs are high, or at least one party is uninformed about the content of the legal default rule, consent to the imposition of the legal
default rule cannot be inferred from silence. Courts should then use
default rules reflecting "the commonsense expectations of the relevant community,"47 since they are most likely to accurately reflect
parties' subjective intent. However, in transactional contexts where
the relational costs of contracting around default rules are high, and
the relational discount on the benefit of doing so is large, even transactors who are well informed about the content of legal default rules
and who could draft specific contractual provisions at relatively low
cost might not choose to vary even those legal rules they find highly
undesirable.48 Consequently, in transactional contexts where relational factors are important, it may be quite difficult to determine
whether interpreting contractual silence as consent to imposition of
45. Marriage is an example of a contracting context where the relational costs of varying
default rules (such as community property or equitable distribution) through a prenuptial agreement may be particularly high. During pre-marital negotiation, a desire to avoid any increase in
the risk of "transaction breakdown" might make the parties reluctant to propose too many
detailed contract provisions.
46. Barnett, supra note 4, at 866.
47. Id at 880.
48. In Barnett's view, "lilt is usually rational for repeat players- even those who are relatively poor-to amortize over many exchanges the cost of obtaining this information [about the
content of default rules] by retaining legal expertise." Id at 892. However, it is in precisely
those situations where both parties are repeat players that the relational costs of contracting
around default rules are likely to be the highest. As a consequence, if Barnett's information and
transactions cost rule were used to decide cases, and courts recognized the existence of relational
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the legal default rule, or as a desire to be governed by conventionalist
49
defaults, will be more likely to effectuate parties' subjective intent.
B. ECONOMIC THEORY
The focus of Ayres and Gertner's economic theory of default
rules is on how the structure and content of default rules can be used
to influence parties' contracting behavior and create incentives for the
largest possible number of transactors to include an efficient mix of
default rules and specific provisions in their contracts. Because relational factors influence parties' drafting decisions, they will also affect
the desirability of hypothetical bargain and penalty default rules.
In transactional contexts where the relational costs of contracting
around default rules are high, and the benefits of doing so are small,
the content of a default rule will have a weaker effect on parties'
drafting decisions than it would in a transactional context where "selfinterested social isolates" engaged in a discrete, arms-length transaction. As a consequence, in such contexts, it may be necessary to
increase the magnitude of the penalty' 0 in penalty defaults in order to
induce at least one of the parties to incur the relational costs of proposing a specific contractual provision. 51 If, however, relational factors are so strong that the content of legal default rules will have little
influence on parties' drafting decisions, it may be desirable for courts
costs, taking these costs explicitly into account might change the court's choice of default rules in
many cases.
49. The existence of relational costs strengthens the arguments in favor of Barnett's suggestion that the court needs to use presumptions in deciding whether to use legal or conventionalist
defaults. If, in determining what default rule to apply, a court had to decide not only whether
the parties were informed about the content of the legal default rules and whether the transaction costs of drafting specific contractual provisions were high, but also whether at the time of
contract formation the relational costs of proposing specific contractual provisions were high, it
would have to undertake a broad-ranging factual and sociological inquiry into the contracting
context. Such an inquiry would be highly uncertain and would greatly increase the cost of contract adjudication. It would lead to many of the same problems as Feinman's "relational
approach." See infra part mE.
50. In transactional contexts where the relational costs of proposing specific contractual
provisions are high for both parties, non-enforcement defaults such as the U.C.C.'s zero-quantity
default, see U.C.C. § 2-201 (1990), may be the most effective way to reduce the relational costs of
proposing a particular type of contractual provision. Once parties have decided to use a legally
enforceable contract, proposing a term that is essential to legal enforceability is unlikely to send
a negative signal.
51. It is important to note that the content of penalty defaults may, over time, affect the
relational costs of proposing to contract around them. If most business people would regard the
legal default rule as unduly onerous, the relational cost of proposing to contract around it may
be small. For example, because the U.CCs warranty provisions are almost always varied by a

[Vol. 3:59 1993]

SOCIAL NORMS

to use the hypothetical bargain approach to gap filling. Because the
content of hypothetical bargain defaults is more likely to be efficient
than the content of penalty defaults which are deliberately set at what
one or both contracting parties do not want,52 hypothetical bargain
defaults have significant advantages over penalty defaults in transactional contexts where the threat of penalty defaults is unlikely to influence parties' drafting decisions, 53 and the court is therefore likely to
be called upon to fill contractual gaps.
Penalty defaults may also induce parties to include specific provisions in their contracts in order to avoid any risk of the imposition of
the penalty, even in situations where relational ties are so strong that
it would be socially desirable to encourage the parties to leave the gap
to be filled cooperatively at the time the contingency arises. Even if
penalty defaults do not induce the parties to include a specific contractual provision in these situations, they may nevertheless be disadvantageous since they may reduce the likelihood that the parties will be
able to fill the gap cooperatively at the time the contingency arises.
Because penalty defaults are often deliberately constructed to disadvantage one party, they may give the other party more to gain by
holding out for an adjudicated outcome than he would have if the
court were to fill the gap using hypothetical bargain defaults. This, in
specific contractual provision, the relational cost of contracting around them may be low. Proposing specific warranty provisions is, in most transactional contexts, as common as setting a
price; it is thus unlikely to carry a negative signal.
52. However, in transactional contexts where the relational costs of proposing specific contractual provisions are not the same for both parties, penalty defaults may still be appropriate.
For example, if a party with an established reputation for fair dealing is contracting with a new
market entrant, the relational cost to the party with the established reputation of proposing a
specific contractual provision may be small or nonexistent. "In contrast, any changes proposed by
the new entrant might lead quickly to transaction breakdown or a price adjustment to compensate the established party for bearing what he perceives as a greater-than-average risk that the
new entrant will rely on his legal rights if a dispute arises. In these types of situations, a larger
set of efficient contracts will be drafted if the default rule is set at what the established party
does not want (a penalty default) since he is more likely than the new entrant to suggest additional contractual provisions.
53. Even if filling gaps with hypothetical bargain defaults increased parties' incentives to
leave additional gaps in their contracts (since they would be able to shift the cost of specifying
these terms to the court), the hypothetical bargain approach might nevertheless be efficient. In
transactional contexts where relational factors are strong, the likelihood that a dispute will wind
up in court is lower than in a discrete transaction. Consequently, the social loss that would result
from the increase in the number of contractual gaps resulting from a hypothetical bargain
approach may be less than the social loss that would result from filling gaps with penalty defaults
(which are more likely than hypothetical bargain defaults to be substantively inefficient) in
transactional contexts where relational costs prevented the parties from contracting around
them.
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turn, might increase the likelihood that the court will be called upon
to engage in gap filling (particularly when it is noted that the parties
are bargaining in a situation of bilateral monopoly), in which case it
will have to fill the gap with the less efficient penalty term.
C. SUMMARY
In sum, while recognizing the importance of relational factors in
many contracting relationships does not undermine the logic of either
the consent theory or economic theory of default rules, it does suggest
that using these theories to structure legal default rules that will be
applied to behavior along the full spectrum from discrete to relational
exchanges may be more complex and less determinate than the proponents of these theories are willing to acknowledge.
Paradoxically, although Feinman maintains that DRA is useless
since it focuses most of its attention on transactional settings in which
the "event of contracting [i]s a self-interested, discrete transaction,"'5 4
explicitly recognizing the effects of relational factors on parties' negotiating and drafting decisions suggests that DRA's focus on the "discrete" transaction may be justified. It is in precisely those situations
where relational factors play a minimal role in the parties' contracting
relationship, that the parties' decision to accept or draft around a particular default rule will be most strongly influenced by the content of
the default rule and will have the greatest impact on the value of the
transaction.5 5 In contrast, in situations where relational factors play a
central role in the parties' contracting relationship, the content of
default rules may be viewed by transactors as peripheral-the relational discount on the benefit of contracting around default rules may
be so large, and the relational cost of proposing changes so high that,
regardless of the content of default rules, parties may not find it bene-,
ficial to contract around them.
III. FEINMAN'S RELATIONAL ALTERNATIVE
Feinman argues that DRA should be abandoned since "the
assumptions underlying the analysis are unjustified, its predictive
54. Feinnan, supra note 1, at 51.
55. Furthermore, since disputes between "steely-eyed utility maximizers" are the types of
contract disputes most likely to wind up in court (since they are least likely to be resolved cooperatively), it is desirable for courts to use those default rules that would be most likely to induce
such parties to draft socially desirable contracts.
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power is poor, and its heuristic framework is biased. ' 6 He suggests
that it be replaced by a relational alternative-a system in which gaps
in contracts are filled by reference to "norms, insights, arguments, and
rules of thumb," and courts strive to "reach just results in regulating
behavior and providing remedies in cases of economic exchange."'
The central "feature of the relational approach is its focus on extensive factual inquiry,""8 designed to determine what kind of a relationship is most desirable in a given transactional setting. In making this
determination, a court using a relational approach should take into
account:
[T]he idea that a party should conform to the essential attributes of
a role, status, or position that has been defined in a relation[,] ...
the idea of mutuality, of a balance between benefits and burdens[,]
... the idea of balancing party planning against maintaining flexibility as relations develop[,] ... the idea of promoting trust and
encouraging cooperation[,] ... [as well as] the whole range of social

policies and values other than those that grow out of the
relationship.5 9
It should then "restate the results [of its inquiry] in traditional doctrinal terms,"'6 so that "over a large number of cases [relational analysis]
may alter the terms of doctrinal analysis," and contract law will
increasingly reflect a deliberate "choice to emphasize certain policies
developed from the law and certain aspects of the underlying social
6
relations." '
Although Feinman maintains that his relational approach will
lead to "just results in regulating behavior and providing remedies in
cases of economic exchange," 62 it will decrease access to justice for
poorer, more risk-averse litigants. In addition, to the extent that the
relational approach seeks to rewrite the terms of the parties' bargain63
56. Feinman, supra note 1, at 49.
57. Id. at 54-55.
58. Id. at 55. Although Richard Craswell maintains that the law-and-economics approach
to DRA also requires extensive factual investigation, see Craswell, supra note 2, at 93-94, the
requisite inquiry is far more limited than would be necessary under Feinman's relational
approach, which strives to "open[] rather than foreclose[] inquiry." Feinman, supranote 1, at
56.
59. Feinman, supra note 1, at 56.
60. Id. at 58.
61. Id. at 57-58.
62. Id. at 55.
63. The redistributive bent of the relational approach is alluded to by Feinman when he
explains that the approach is not based on a "sort of mindless empiricism, a mere application of
existing social norms through rules of law." Rather, it "contains a significant normative dimension that brings preferences and values to legal analysis ... ." Id. at 57 n.30.
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in an effort to further relational norms such as achieving a balancing
of benefits and burdens, it may wind up limiting contracting opportunities for the types of parties relational standards seek to protect.6 4
Adopting the relational approach may also increase the cost of contracting since parties who seek to avoid the uncertainty associated
with open-ended relational standards will draft increasingly detailed

contracts.
A. EFFEcrs ON Accwss TO JUsTICE
Filling gaps with relational standards and imposing "liability
based on custom, usage, and social values in the absence of a specific
text" 65 may give judges additional flexibility to do justice in the individual case once a case is actually before them. However, it will also
create a systematic bias against poorer and more risk-averse litigants
in the selection of disputes for judicial resolution.6 6
Fact-based relational default standards will increase the cost of
litigation, increase the uncertainty associated with adjudicative outcomes, and make it nearly impossible to resolve a case on summary

judgment. Since contingent fee arrangements are not generally available in contracts cases, this increase in litigation costs may make adjudication inaccessible to poorer litigants and lower the settlement value
of a claim. 67 In addition, because the adjudicative uncertainty associ-

ated with the application of relational standards will impose greater
64. It may also create incentives for parties to restructure transactions in order to avoid
bringing their relationship within particular relational paradigms. There is no reason to believe
that these restructurings will be socially desirable.
65. Feinman, supra note 1, at 55.
66. See e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay,Macneil and the Discovery of Solidarity and
Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rav. 565,572 ("Parties with a lot of resources ... do not
mind general equitable standards even if the substance of such standards cuts against them
because they cannot practically be enforced without a lot of expensive evidence.").
67. The ability to threaten to impose high litigation costs will improve the bargaining position of the party with superior resources and may enable defendants with superior bargaining
power to pay less in settlement than they would in a jurisdiction that applied a less fact-specific
legal rule. At the outset of the litigation process, the minimum settlement a risk-neutral plaintiff
will accept is his expected gain from going to trial-namely, his probability of prevailing multiplied by the amount he will recover if he prevails, less his litigation costs. Consequently, as the
litigation costs that the defendant can threaten to impose on the plaintiff increase, the minimum
amount he will have to pay to induce the plaintiff to settle the claim at the outset will decrease.
Since relational standards increase the cost of litigation, they may enable defendants with superior bargaining power to pay less in settlement. In situations where the weaker party does not
obtain an ex ante price adjustment to compensate her for the possibility that if a contingency
arose she would settle for this amount, the application of the relational standard will leave her
worse off than she would have been in a nonrelational jurisdiction.
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costs on the more risk-averse contracting party,68 the less risk-averse
party may be able to obtain a more favorable settlement6 9 in a relational jurisdiction than in a jurisdiction where the court would apply a
more predictable legal rule?0

B. Lmrrs ON CONTRACrnNG OPPORTuNITIS
Many of Feinman's relational standards seek to reallocate wealth
from one type of contracting party to another in an effort to do justice
in the individual case and to further "the whole range of social policies
71
and values other than those that grow out of the relationship."
Although the relational approach may appear to protect the interests
of less-powerful contracting parties by insisting that contractual obligations reflect mutuality and reciprocity,72 to the extent that it systematically rewrites certain types of bargains, it may decrease contracting
opportunities for the types of transactors that relational standards
seek to protect.
If, for example, courts routinely applied relational standards that
tended to redistribute wealth from type A contracting parties to type
B contracting parties, type A parties might become reluctant to deal
with type B parties. Alternatively, they might agree to transact with
type B parties, but only if detailed contracts that would avoid the risk
of relational gap filling or interpretation were used, or they were able
to obtain an ex ante price adjustment to compensate them for the risk
68. It is also important to note that the uncertainty associated with the outcome of the
application of relational standards might systematically disadvantage certain types of contracting
parties, such as franchisees, upon whom legal uncertainty imposes especially high costs (again
assuming that such parties do not obtain an ex ante price adjustment to compensate them for
this risk); it might also leave such parties especially vulnerable to demands for additional performance during the life of the contract.
69. A risk-averse plaintiff will accept a much lower settlement offer than a risk-neutral
plaintiff and a risk-averse defendant will agree to pay a much higher settlement than a riskneutral defendant.
70. Filling gaps with the types of conventionalist default rules suggested by the consent
theory may also limit access to justice for poorer, more risk-averse litigants since determining the
content of conventionalist defaults would require the same type of expensive, fact-specific, subjective, and unpredictable inquiry that is needed to give content to relational standards.
71. Feinman,supra note 1, at 56. One goal of relational analysis is to encourage productive
economic relations by determining what transactional structures have characterized productive
and successful economic relations in similar contexts (or paradigmatic cases) in the past, and
then reallocating the parties' rights and duties under existing contracts in an effort to replicate
successful transactional structures. See Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of ContractTheory, 58
U. CiN. L. Ra,. 1283, 1304-08 (1990).
72. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 1, at 56.
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of suffering a redistributive judgment in the event of a dispute.7 3
Since the application of relational standards will increase the cost to

type A parties of dealing with type B parties, the use of such standards
may decrease contracting opportunities for type B parties.7 4 These
opportunity-limiting effects are likely to occur whenever contract law
seeks to systematically favor one type of contracting party over
another by trumping the terms (either express or implied) of private

agreements. As Judge Richard Posner observed:
The idea that favoring one side or the other in a class of contract
disputes can redistribute wealth is one of the most persistent illusions of judicial power. It comes from failing to consider the full
consequences of legal decisions. Courts deciding contract cases cannot durably shift the balance of advantages to the weaker side of the
market; they can only make contracts more costly to that side in the
future, because [the disfavored party] will demand compensation
for bearing onerous terms.75

73. The price effects of redistributive legal doctrines or legislation have been demonstrated
empirically in a variety of settings. For an empirical study demonstrating that, in some markets,
legal rules that protect franchisees by making it harder to cancel a franchise increase the price of
the franchise, see James A. Brickley et aL, The EconomicEffects of FranchiseTermination Laws,
34 J.L. & ECON. 101 (1991). These types of price effects are typically dismissed as unimportant
by relational scholars who cite franchisees' support for protective legislation as evidence of their
desirability. For example, discussing the effects of such legislation, Macneil observes that "[in
the case of franchising, the reduction of choice is one sided; regulations restricting the freedom
of franchisors to terminate dealerships do not reduce choice for all participants." Ian R.Macneil, Values in Contract.Internaland External, 78 Nw. U. L. Rav. 340, 377 (1983). However,
Macneil's analysis ignores the possibility that the franchisees surveyed might not know how
much these judicial and legislative protections raised the price of their franchise and that some
franchisees might, if given a choice, have preferred fewer protections and a lower initial
franchise fee. It also ignores the fact that those people who are already franchisees will benefit
from the legislation until they next have to negotiate a price for renewal of their franchise.
74. Implementation of Barett's theory of conventionalist defaults might have similar
opportunity-limiting effects. Barnett suggests that "when parties have asymmetric access to the
background rules of contract, [filling gaps with] conventionalist default rules will ... provid[e]
parties who are rationally informed of the background rules of law with an incentive to educate
those parties who are rationally ignorant of these rules." Barnett, supra note 4, at 829.
Although Barnett's rule will give a well-informed party who prefers the legal default rule some
incentive to disclose its content to an uninformed party, it may also increase the cost to informed
parties of transacting with less well-informed parties and thereby limit the contracting opportunities of less well-informed market participants. In some contexts, however, the cost of informing the less well-informed contracting party might be small (for example, in transactions
concluded using standard form contracts hat set out the relevant legal default rules as boilerplate) and, if most of the transactors that well-informed parties might deal with are uninformed,
the opportunity-limiting effect of Barnett's rule may not be large.
75. The Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970
F.2d 273, 282 (7th Cir. 1992).
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C. SUMMARY
Although filling contractual gaps and resolving linguistic ambiguities by reference to "norms, insights, arguments, and rules of thumb"75
may give judges greater flexibility to do justice in the individual case,
it will also increase litigation costs, create uncertainty, and make summary judgment nearly unavailable in contracts cases. As a consequence, the prospective effect of adopting such an approach may be to
systematically decrease access to justice for poorer or more riskaverse contracting parties and, depending on the content of relational
standards, to limit contracting opportunities
for the types of transac7
tors relational standards seek to protect
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AVAILABILITY OF
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR DRA
The widespread availability of binding private ADR has important implications for the questions and concerns that are at the heart
of the default rules debate.78 Although DRA implicitly assumes that
76. Feinman, supra note 1, at 54.
77. The "relational approach" to DRA may also undermine some of the norms that relational contract theorists seek to encourage. For example, it may create incentives for transactors
who are disadvantaged by the legal uncertainty and high litigation costs created by the application of open-ended relational standards to draft detailed contracts containing relatively objective
provisions. Such contracts might undermine the relational norm of "flexibility," a danger explicitly recognized by Feinman. See Feinman, supra note 71, at 1304 ("[i]mposing a norm of flexibility may cause parties to be more precise in specifying the terms of their contracts and therefore
less flexible").
78. The failure to take into account the availability of ADR, and to conceive of ADR as a
way of filling contractual gaps ex post, leads Easterbrook and Fischel to conclude that the need
for corporate law (which they view as a set of contract default rules) can be explained by recognizing that, as compared to
law firms or corporate service bureaus or investment banks[, which could] compile sets
of terms on which corporations may be constructed[, ...[c]ourt systems have a comparative advantage in supplying answers to questions that do not occur in time to be
resolved ex ante. Common law systems need not answer questions unless they occur.
This is an economizing device. The accumulation of cases dealing with unusual
problems than supplies a level of detail that is costly to duplicate through private bargaining. To put it differently, "contractual" terms for many kinds of problems turn out
to be public goods!
FRANK H. EASTMRBROOK & DANr.L R. FSCHEL, TmE ECONOMIC STRucrunR OF CORPORATE
LAw 35 (1991). This argument assumes that any institutions that might try to compete with the
law and the court system for the provision of corporate law would have to do so ex ante. It
completely ignores the possibility of including an ADR clause in a corporate charter designating
a third-party neutral to supply "answers to questions that do not occur in time to be resolved ex
ante." Id. Easterbrook and Fischel might, however, respond, that "[elven if law firms, investment banks, or other private suppliers of solutions could specify optimal solutions ....[n]o one
firm could capture all
of the gains from working out all problems in advance, because other firms
could copy the answers without paying the creator." Id. While this might be true with respect to
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contractual gaps must be filled by either legal default rules or detailed
contractual provisions, ADR provisions provide parties with alternative ways of dealing with contractual gaps. In many transactional contexts, ADR provisions function as (1) substitutes for the legal default
regimes (sets of default rules) provided by the state, (2) substitutes for
the detailed contractual provisions that could be drafted by the parties, or (3) substitutes for reputation or other relational factors that
distinguish "discrete" from relational exchange. When inclusion of an
ADR provision is viewed as a way of selecting an alternative default
regime, the consent theory's preference for conventionalist default
rules may become more difficult to justify. Similarly, when ADR provisions function as substitutes for legal default regimes, detailed contractual provisions, or other relational factors, the economic theory's
framework for determining the structure and content of optimal
default rules may become more complex, and the informationrevealing effect of penalty defaults may become weaker. In addition,
to the extent that it is socially desirable to promote relational values in
commercial relationships, encouraging the use of ADR may be a better way to do so than adopting Feinman's relational alternative.

A. CoNsENT THmORY
According to the consent theory, because "[tihe cost of 'contracting around' the existing package of [legal] default and immutable
rules by resorting to extra-legal methods of assuring performance is
exceedingly high.... The choice to acquiesce to the legal background
rules [under the current legal order] ... resembles the duress of the
gunman's demand of one's money ....,,79 As a consequence, consent
to the imposition of particular legal default rules cannot be inferred
from parties' failure to draft around them, and courts should fill gaps
ex ante contractual provisions, it might not be true of terms supplied ex post by a third-party
neutral. Each time the neutral supplies the type of gap-filling term that Easterbrook and Fischel
suggest that the law should supply, namely "the rule that, if uniformly applied, will maximize the
value of corporate endeavor as a whole," id.,
his reputation for selecting such terms will become
stronger, and more corporations will include ADR provisions giving him the authority to resolve
disputes. This will become increasingly true to the extent that the neutral's decisions (or the
decisions of the neutrals of a particular firm or organization) are rendered in a written form that
explains the factual basis and legal reasoning used to reach the result, since this will increase the
predictability of the neutrals decisions. While competitors will be able to appropriate the results
of particular rulings without paying for them, they will not be able to appropriate the value of
the neutral's skill in rendering decisions. Thus, when ADR is viewed as a way to fill contractual
gaps ex post, it may be necessary to re-examine some of the underpinnings of the literature on
the corporation as contract and corporate law as a set of efficient contract default rules.
79. Barnett, supra note 4, at 903.
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using conventionalist default rules since these are likely to "conform
as closely as possible to the subjective agreement of the parties."'8 0
Barnett suggests, however, that if the cost of acquiring information
about or contracting around legal default rules was lower, or jurisdictions competed in the provision of default rules so that the "legal system was more horizontal and less vertical,"8 " it would no longer be
necessary to fill gaps with conventionalist defaults. "[Plarties would
[then] choose those legal systems that offer[ed] them the best overall
package of default and immutable rules. Under these conditions, a
general consent to be legally bound... might be construed as including a genuine consent even to those immutable rules that one cannot
contract around."' s
The legal system is, however, already far more horizontal than
Barnett recognizes. Although state competition to provide desirable
contract default rules may not be as intense as state competition to
provide corporate default rules,8 3 in many transactional settings, parties nevertheless have a meaningful choice of legal default regimes.
Parties can often choose to structure their transaction in a variety of
ways, each of which is associated with a different legal default regime.
In some contexts, partnership law, corporate law, or trust law can be
effective, and sometimes superior, substitutes for contract law.84 Consider, for example, two people who want to produce featherbeds. One
has the capital and the other knows how to produce the beds. These
parties can go into business as partners, making partnership law the
relevant default regime; they can form a corporation, making corporate law the relevant default regime; or they can enter into a contract,
whereby the party who knows how to make the beds is engaged by the
party supplying the capital for a salary and/or a percentage of the
80. Ia at 875. For a discussion of the reasons why conventionalist defaults are more likely
than legal defaults to reflect the subjective agreement of the parties, see id. at 875-94.
81. Id. at 904.
82. Id. at 905.
83. Although states do not have the same incentives to compete in the provision of contract default rules that they do in the provision of corporate default rules (namely, incorporation
fees and business for local attorneys), the widespread use of choice-of-law provisions suggests
that parties must perceive some important differences among jurisdictions, otherwise they would
not incur the costs of drafting these provisions.
84. The idea that corporate law and partnership law are, in some settings, substitutes for
contract law is consistent with Coase's theory of the firm, see R.H. Coase, The Nature of the
Firm, 4 EcoNomicA 3856 (1937), and Easterbrook and Fischel's view of the corporation as a
nexus of contracts, see EASTERBROOK & FisCHEL, supra note 78, at 34 (suggesting that "corporate law is a set of terms available off-the-rack so that participants in corporate ventures can save
the cost of contracting").
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profit, making contract law the relevant default regime. Thus, in
choosing among a variety of different transactional structures, parties
are often, in effect, choosing among competing horizontal legal
default regimes.
Parties' choice of default regimes is even broader once it is recognized that ADR provisions enable parties to inexpensively contract
for any of a variety of competing extralegal "horizontal default
regimes" to govern their transaction. There is substantial evidence to
suggest that a shift to a more horizontal system of competing default
regimes is being facilitated by the rapid growth in the use of ADR.
Many industries have their own sets of transactional rules and/or specialized ADR programs. In the diamond industry, for example, as a
condition of trading in the world's twenty diamond exchanges, transactors must agree to submit all disputes to the exchanges' own arbitration panels, which resolve them in accordance with an industryspecific commercial code as well as trade norms and customs. Many
of these transactional rules are outright rejections of the rules that a
court would apply.85 Similarly, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
requires all members to resolve many types of disputes through
exchange-run arbitration and mediation tribunals which apply the
exchange's own transactional rules.8" A number of other industries
have codified industry-wide standards and have instituted industryspecific ADR programsY' These codes and programs enable industry
85. See Bernstein, supra note 38, at 154-57 (discussing the differences between the U.C.C.
and the diamond industry's commercial code, as well as the differences between federal bankruptcy law and the diamond industry's bankruptcy code).
86. See, e.g., CO NsoLDATED RULES oF= .'E
CucAGo MERcANrLn EXCHANGE AND T-m
INTERNATIONAL MoNETARY MARxET DivIsION AND THE INDEX AND OPTIoN MARxEr Divi.

sIoN § 600(A)-(B) (1992).
87. For example, most truth-in-advertising disputes between companies are submitted to
the National Advertising Division of the Council of Better Business Bureaus, which has its own
nonbinding arbitration tribunals whose decisions are typically accepted by the parties. See
COUNCIL oF BE-itR Busumss BUREAUS, INC., NATIONAL ADnv'nsmna DivisION, NATIONAL
ADVERTISING Rnvmw UNrr & NATIONAL ADVERTISING REvIEW PROcEDuREs (1993). Similarly, ten of the country's largest food producers have agreed to attempt to resolve certain types
of disputes among themselves through ADR for 90 days before litigating. Major Food CompaiesAgree to CPR Planto Try ADR for 90 Days Before FilingLawsuits, 11 ALTERNATIVE 23, 23
(1993). Attempts are currently underway to persuade other industry participants to sign the
agreement. Id. In addition, the American Arbitration Association runs specialized ADR programs for many industries, including the textile industry, the construction industry, the securities
industry, and the American Fats and Oils Association. It also has special rules that are designed
to govern particular types of disputes such as the Accident-Claim Arbitration Rules, MultiEmployer Pension Plans for Withdrawal Liability Dispute Rules, Real Estate Valuation Arbitration Rules, Title Insurance Arbitration Rules, and Patent Arbitration Rules.
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participants to obtain the benefits of highly tailored contractual provisions without incurring the transaction costs of drafting the types of
detailed provisions that would be necessary to convey the content of
industry-specific rules or norms to a court.
Over time, as parties and lawyers become increasingly aware of
the ways that ADR provisions can be used to create and access alternative default regimes, and as industries and trade associations come
to realize the benefits of drafting industry-specific commercial codes,
the availability of competing extralegal default regimes is likely to
pose an increasingly powerful challenge to the consent theory's preference for conventionalist defaults as which is based in large part on
the assumption that there is little competition in the market for the
provision of contract default rules and that the existing legal order is
essentially verticalP9 In addition, in some contracting contexts, as
ADR provisions become more common, it will become increasingly
difficult to determine what meaning of contractual silence is most
likely to "conform as closely as possible to the subjective agreement of
the parties." For example, in contracting contexts where the transaction costs of including a wiseman provision-a provision requiring
that all disputes be resolved by an experienced industry member in
accord with industry custom-are low and parties have good information about the availability of ADR, it is no longer clear that parties
who fail to include such a provision in their contract are likely to be
expressing a preference that their transaction be governed by industry
norms. Rather, the absence of such a provision might be taken to be a
tacit signal of consent to be bound by legal default rules.

B. ECONOMIC THEORY
The availability of ADR provisions and alternative default
regimes also has implications for the economic theory of default rules.
88. See Barnett, supra note 4, at 882 ("Given that a default rule reflecting the commonsense expectations within the relevant community of discourse is likely to satisfy the parties'
intentions as well [as] . .or better... than any rival default rule, there is strong reason to prefer

it.").
89. However, to the extent that ADR facilitates the creation of competing default regimes,
its greater use is likely to be viewed favorably by consent theorists like Barnett, who have suggested that viewing consent as the basis of contractual obligation "may justify a more radical
change in the legal system" to a more "horizontal legal order composed of competing legal
systems, in contrast to the relatively vertical, monopolistic legal order we live in today." Id. at
829.
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It may affect both the type of contracting behavior it is socially desirable to encourage and the ways that parties respond to penalty default
rules.
In certain transactional settings, it might be socially desirable to
structure default rules to encourage inclusion of an ADR clause. For
example, if the parties want their transaction to be governed by industry norms, it might be desirable for them to include a wiseman provision which designates a respected member of the industry to resolve
all disputes according to industry norms and customs. The expected
cost of the wiseman filling gaps will often be less than the cost to the
parties of including specific contractual provisions ex ante, 90 the
expected cost to the court of filling gaps ex post, and the expected cost
to the parties of cooperatively filling the gap at the time the contingency arises. 91 Unlike contractual provisions detailing industry
norms,91 wiseman provisions are inexpensive to draft.93 And, unlike
judges who must determine the content of industry norms from the
conflicting testimony of expert witnesses, wisemen are familiar with
these norms and will therefore be able to resolve disputes more accurately and at a lower cost than a court. In addition, the relational
costs of proposing a wiseman provision may be far lower than the
relational costs of proposing numerous provisions detailing industry
norms. Only one provision needs to be drafted, and proposing ADR
might be viewed as a signal that a party prefers to resolve disputes
cooperatively.
Although wiseman provisions and other ADR clauses can create
joint gains for the parties,94 there are a number of barriers to parties'
90. Although the inclusion of a wiseman provision will create an incentive for the parties to
both draft fewer provisions and leave more issues for the wiseman to resolve, they will only do
so if this is less expensive than including detailed contractual provisions since they bear the full
cost of wiseman dispute resolution.
91. It is important to note that once a wiseman provision is included, the probability that
the parties will cooperatively fill the gap at the time the contingency arises is likely to be much
higher than it would have been without the provision, since neither party can threaten to inflict
the cost and delay of litigation on the other.
92. Social norms and industry custom are often expensive to specify in a clear-enough manner to enable a judge or a jury to accurately apply them in the event of a dispute. Such norms
often embody standards that transactors internalize over a long period of time. In many contexts, they cannot be stated with rule-like precision even by experienced industry members.
93. It has been suggested that while wiseman provisions are inexpensive to draft, the negotiation costs of including one are likely to be high since it may be difficult for the parties to agree
on an acceptable neutral. Although this may be true in some transactional settings, such provisions are often included at the time of contracting when each party has an incentive to signal its
preference for a cooperative rather than a litigious relationship.
94. For a discussion of the many ways that ADR clauses can create contractual value, see
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including such provisions in their contractsf 5 As a consequence, from
a social perspective, it may be desirable to structure default rules in a
way that will encourage parties who want disputes to be resolved
according to particularized norms and customs to include an ADR
provision in their contract. Courts might, for example, increase the
costs taxed to the litigants or create a penalty default by refusing to
look to industry custom in determining the content of legal default
6
rulesY
In addition to influencing the type of contracting behavior it is
socially desirable to encourage, the availability of ADR may influence
the ways that parties respond to penalty default rules. When a party is
faced with one or more penalty defaults but is reluctant to include
specific provisions contracting around them since doing so might
reveal information that will trigger a price adjustment, she might find
it advantageous to propose an ADR provision. Given the wide variety of reasons that parties find ADR provisions attractive,9 7 including
an ADR provision directing a third-party neutral to use a particular
default regime in resolving a variety of disputes may weaken, though
perhaps not entirely eliminate, the informational signal sent by proposing to contract around a particular default rule. Thus, when ADR
provisions are used in this manner, the information-revealing effects
of penalty defaults may be weaker than the economic theory suggests.

Lisa Bernstein, Understandingthe Linitsof Court-ConnectedADR- A Critiqueof FederalCourtAnnexed ArbitrationPrograms,141 U. PA. L. RFv. 2169,2240-53 (1993).
95. As discussed earlier, standard-like default rules that increase uncertainty, delay, and
the cost of litigation tend to advantage large, less risk-averse contracting parties who can afford
to lay out litigation expenses, and who are better able to bear the costs of delay. As a consequence, these types of parties are often reluctant to include ADR provisions since, if a dispute
arises, their superior resources and ability to bear the cost of delay might enable them to settle
on more favorable terms than they would be able to obtain if the dispute could be quickly and
inexpensively resolved through ADR. For a detailed discussion of the ways that asymmetric risk
aversion and the asymmetric ability to bear the costs of delay create barriers to parties including
ADR provisions in their contracts even when doing so could produce private benefits, see id. at
2193-95.
96. Another way to encourage the use of ADR provisions is to attempt to reduce the tremendous bargaining advantages that stronger, less risk-averse contracting parties obtain from
having their contract disputes resolved through the legal system. This suggests that rule-like
defaults may be more likely to encourage parties to include ADR provisions since they reduce
the bargaining advantage the stronger party gains from being able to threaten to litigate.
97. Parties may prefer to resolve disputes through ADR rather than litigation for a variety
of reasons such as cost savings, informality, reduction of delay, and the benefits of an expert
adjudicator. For a more extensive discussion of the myriad of reasons parties use ADR, see
Bernstein, supra note 94, at 2239-53.
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Inclusion of an ADR provision may also provide a way for parties
to a discrete transaction to capture some of the benefits of a continuing relational exchange. In contracting contexts where parties would
prefer not to include too many specific contract provisions, perhaps
because drafting costs are high, relational costs are significant, or contingencies cannot be adequately anticipated, but parties do not have a
strong enough relationship to be willing to leave gaps to be cooperatively filled at the time a contingency arises, they may find it desirable
to leave certain types of disputes to be resolved by a wiseman under a
clause directing him to reconstruct the parties' hypothetical bargain.
When used in this manner, wiseman provisions function as substitutes
for the parties' reputations; they can enable parties to a discrete
exchange to capture many of the benefits of a continuing relational
exchange. They can also help transform contracting relationships that
begin as discrete exchanges into continuing relational exchanges by
providing a mechanism for resolving disputes or disagreements that
arise before the parties fully trust one another enough to be willing to
rely on their ability to reach cooperative agreements.
In sum, when traditional adjudication is viewed as a default rule,
the economic theory suggests that legal default rules should be structured to create incentives for parties to draft contracts that have not
only the optimal mix of specific provisions and default rules, but also
the optimal mix of terms to be adjudicated in a legal forum, resolved
through ADR, or left solely to extralegal norms and institutions.
C. Ti

RELATIONAL ALTERNATIVE

Cr

ADR tribunals may be better than courts in applying relational
standards and promoting relational values. One goal of relational
adjudication is to reach results that fit in harmoniously with the
existing "social matrix."98 Such results are more likely to occur when
the adjudicator is drawn from the relevant social community. Simi.larly, to the extent that the informality of some ADR proceedings
enables parties to amicably resolve disputes, ADR is more likely than
litigation to further the norm of "preservation of relations." 99 Furthermore, unlike judges who are able to award only money damages
98. See Macneil, supra note 73, at 346-49.
99. For a discussion of the importance of this norm, see id.at 377-78. A desire to resolve
disputes while preserving the relationship between the parties is one of the primary motivations
behind the recently created National Franchise Mediation Program under which signatory
franchisors attempt to mediate disputes with franchisees. See FranchisorsForm Special ADR
Vehicle, 11 ALTERNATVES 37, 37 (1993) (noting that "mediation has advantages not available
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or specific performance, arbitrators and other third-party neutrals can
fashion creative remedies designed to preserve the value of the parties' relationship. They might, for example, require or encourage joint
control over a resource in dispute."co In short, if ADR can achieve the
goals its proponents suggest, 1' 1 it may be a more effective way to promote relational values in commercial relationships than Feinman's
relational alternative, even in situations where the third-party neutral
does not explicitly apply relational standards of the kind Feinman proposes.10 In addition, since ADR proceedings can be conducted
shortly after the dispute arises and are often far less expensive than
litigation, 10 3 implementing Feinman's relational alternative through
ADR rather than litigation will reduce,
though not eliminate, some of
04
its undesirable distributional effects.
through the adversarial process that previously dominated dispute resolution in the [franchise]
industry... [Miost notably, it provides the opportunity to preserve productivity and the underlying business relationship.").
100. See, eg., Ian L Macneil, EconomicAnalysis of ContractualRelations.Its Shortfalls and
the Need for a "Rich ClassificatoryApparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1018, 1033 (discussing "the
need in relational contract to cooperate in planning in the future, planning that will involve
exercises of choice").
101. See STEPHA B. GOLDBERG FT AT-, DxsPuTE REsOLUTON: NEGOTIATION, MFDIATION,
AN OTHER PRocnssns 7 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the hope of ADR proponents that
"expanded use of informal [dispute resolution] methods in this country would result in resolutions more suited to parties' needs, reduced reliance on laws and lawyers, rebirth of local communities, maintenance of long-term relationships, and relief for nonparties affected by the
conflict").
102. Se4 eg., Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations
Under Classica4 Neoclassicaland Relational ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 854, 879 (1978)
(discussing the ways that ADR provisions can be used to help promote relational values and
noting that "[p]rovisions for meeting together to discuss problems, for mediation in [the] event
of a dispute, and for arbitration are all examples of planning which tends to keep relations
going").
103. Although ADR proceedings can be as costly and delay-prone as litigation, parties who
prefer an inexpensive proceeding conducted shortly after a dispute arises can include provisions
designed to further these goals. They might, for example, include a provision limiting the
amount of pre-arbitration discovery permitted, a provision requiring the arbitration to be commenced a fixed number of days after an official request is filed, or a provision requiring the
hearing to be conducted on consecutive days.
104. As discussed in the text, one of the main ways that ADR provisions can create value is
by enabling parties in a discrete arms-length exchange to capture many of the benefits of continuing contractual relationship characterized by trust and strong relational ties. Consider, for
example, two "self-interested social isolates" who do not trust one another but want to enter into
a transaction where flexibility about the types of raw materials to be used in a manufacturing
process is important since raw material prices fluctuate widely over time. The parties would like
to draft a clause giving the manufacturer the right to make substitutions that do not unduly
impair the quality of the goods, but the buyer is reluctant to agree to such a clause since the cost
of enforcing it in court will be high and he has no reason to think that the manufacturer will act
in good faith. In such a situation, the parties can designate a wiseman whose reputation they
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Thus, using default rules to selectively encourage the use of ADR
is consistent with Feinman's relational alternative, since more widespread use of ADR will promote relational values. It is also consistent
with the economic theory of default rules since it is sometimes socially
desirable to encourage parties to include ADR provisions directing a
third-party neutral to resolve disputes by applying social or industryspecific norms, or to fill contractual gaps by reconstructing the parties'
"hypothetical bargain." Encouraging the use of ADR is also consistent with the consent theory, not only because it will facilitate the
development and accessibility of competing default regimes, but also
because third-party neutrals who are part of the "relevant community
of discourse" are more likely than generalist judges"0 5 to discern the
"commonsense understanding of the parties" and to render decisions
that will "conform as closely as possible to the [parties'] subjective
1 o6
agreement."
-

V.

CONCLUSION

This comment has argued that while the effects of social norms
and other relational factors on parties' contracting behavior must be
taken into account in any theory of default rules that seeks to influence, interpret, or reconstruct the contracting process, relational standards should be not be used to fill gaps and interpret contracts. It has
explored the ways that the core insights of relational contract theory
can be integrated into the leading academic approaches to DRA, and
has demonstrated that giving social norms the prominence they
deserve does not, as Feinman maintains, require a rejection of DRA
or abandonment of the assumptions of rationality and self-interest.
Rather, understanding a contracts' relational context may help an
adjudicator more accurately determine the parties' subjective intent,
and may help courts and legislatures more accurately assess the social
desirability of different types of legal default rules.

both value, to approve or disapprove of all proposed changes on the basis of brief written submissions within two days of the request. Since the wiseman has no incentive to behave opportunistically, if he renders the same decisions that would be reached by parties engaged in
continuing relations, the clause will give the "self-interested social isolates" the benefit of strong
relational ties.
105. See Barnett, supra note 4, at 907-08 (discussing how to determine the commonsense

understanding of the parties and suggesting that "[tio the extent that judges are selected from
the relevant community of discourse, they may discover the commonsense understandings of the
parties ... by introspection").

106. Id. at 875.

THE RELATIONAL MOVE: SOME
QUESTIONS FROM LAW AND
ECONOMICS
RICHARD CRASWELL*

I am no more an aficionado of the relational contract literature
than Jay Feinman is of the literature on default rules. However, I
have always been troubled by a sense that I ought to like relational
analysis better than I in fact do. After all, those who analyze contracts
from a relational perspective are seriously committed to their work. I
flatter myself that I am capable of learning from those who are not my
soulmates, and I have indeed learned from the criticisms relational
scholars have addressed to my own preferred method, economic analysis.1. Why, then, have I not been able to learn from these scholars'
distinctively relational analysis?
Professor Feinman's contribution to this symposium provides an
opportunity to address this issue. In fact, I agree with Professor
Feinman that our two modes of analysis are trying to answer different
questions. From my point of view, relational analysis seems frustratingly indifferent to the questions I am interested in, while the questions it does ask seem to me to be largely irrelevant.
Before elaborating on these differences, some clarification may
be necessary. Economic analysts sometimes use the phrase relational
contractas little more than a synonym for a contract which is incomplete in some important sense.2 These analysts then use economics to
identify the most efficient solution to this incompleteness. This is not
what Professor Feinman means by relational analysis, and it is not
*
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1. See e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract. Circlesin the Sky, 68 VA. L. Ray.
947 (1982).
2. E.g., Charles . Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principlesof RelationalContracts,67 VA. L.
RMv. 1089,1090-91 (1981); Robert E. Scott, A RelationalTheory of Default Rulesfor Commercial Contracts,193L LEGAL ST=D. 597 (1990); Alan Schwartz, RelationalContractsin the Courts:
An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and JudicialStrategies,21 . LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992).

